

Trump's protectionism: winners and losers

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NATIONAL ECONOMIC EDUCATION DELEGATION

Figure: <https://needelegation.org>

- ▶ **Who?** Founded by Jon Haveman
 - ▶ Hon. Board: 2 Fed Chairs, 6 CEA Chairs, 3 Nobel Lauratus
 - ▶ Delegates: 361 PhD economists
- ▶ **Vision?** NEED presentations \Rightarrow public discussions of policy...
 - ▶ based on accurate perception of econ principles & data
- ▶ **Non-partisan and consensus view**
 - ▶ Material reviewed by liberal & conservative economist

Motivation

- ▶ Lots of controversial tariffs imposed over last 12 months
 - ▶ Biggest could be coming any day
- ▶ Typically real world trade policy is rather dull

Overview of Trump's tariffs on US imports




Figure: Trump's tariffs (2017 \$bn imports)

Outline

Trump's tariffs

- Safeguard tariffs

- National security tariffs: steel & aluminum

- Unfair trade practices tariffs by China

- National security tariffs: autos & auto parts

Trade deficits

Conclusion

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Legislative authority

- ▶ General principle
 - ▶ US Constitution: Congress sole power over international commerce
 - ▶ Congress has delegated power in many situations
- ▶ Safeguard tariffs: Section 201, Trade Act of 1974
 - ▶ If USITC agree import surge \Rightarrow major injury to industry...
 - ▶ Executive power for temporary tariffs
- ▶ Historially rare
 - ▶ 11 times in past, last was 2002 Bush steel tariffs

Solar panel & washing machine tariffs

- ▶ Imports: solar panels (\$8.5bn), washing machines (\$1.8bn)
- ▶ Jan 2018: “Tariff rate quotas” imposed by Trump
 - ▶ “Low” tariffs on initial volume of imports
 - ▶ 0% solar panels, 20% washing machines
 - ▶ “High” tariffs on excess volume
 - ▶ 30% solar panels, 50% washing machines
 - ▶ Phased out over 3-4 years

Winners & losers in US

- ▶ US tariffs = tax on US imports. So, higher prices in US ▶ Fig.
 - ▶ Winners: US producers & their workers
 - ▶ Losers: US “consumers” (firms & their workers)
- ▶ Winners: solar panel & washing machine producers
 - ▶ Suniva, Solar World, Whirlpool
 - ▶ But...
 - ▶ ↓ cons subsidies in China, LG & Samsung relocate to US
- ▶ Losers
 - ▶ Consumers, can be firms
 - ▶ 85% of solar panel employment in distribution & installation
 - ▶ Industries facing foreign retaliation
 - ▶ Texas sorghum (Chinese AD case)

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Legislative authority

- ▶ Section 232, Trade Expansion Act of 1962
 - ▶ Dept of Commerce conducts investigation
 - ▶ Upon receipt of report, President makes own decision
 - ▶ Essentially unlimited power, need not be temporary
- ▶ Extremely rare
 - ▶ Excluding oil, used only by Reagan (once in 1983)!
- ▶ Is there a real issue here?
 - ▶ Yes: massive steel overcapacity in China
 - ▶ But, China appears willing to negotiate

Steel & aluminum tariffs

- ▶ March 2018: Trump announces tariffs
- ▶ Steel: 25% tariff on \$24bn imports
 - ▶ Only 20% total demand imported
 - ▶ CAN+EU+MEX+KOR+JAP= 63%, RUS 5%, CHN 3%
- ▶ Aluminum: 10% tariff on \$16bn imports
 - ▶ 75-90% of total demand imported
 - ▶ CAN 37%, CHN+RUS 18%
- ▶ WTO challenges ongoing
 - ▶ US stance: self-determination
 - ▶ Foreign stance: can say anything is “national security”

Winners & losers in US

- ▶ **Winners: steel producers & their workers** ▶ Fig.
 - ▶ Nucor, United States Steel, AK steel
 - ▶ BEA: 140,000 jobs in steel producing industries
- ▶ **Losers**
 - ▶ Consumers, including steel consuming firms
 - ▶ Steel major intermediate input throughout economy
 - ▶ BEA: 2 million jobs in steel consuming industries (>5% input)
 - ▶ Industries facing foreign retaliation

Industry	Countries	Share of US EX
Pork	CHN, MEX	44%
Apples	CHN, MEX, IND	37%
Nuts	CHN, IND	12%
Whiskies (e.g. KY bourbon)	EU, CAN, MEX	53%
Mineral water, coffee, ketchup	CAN	≈ 50%

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- ▶ Section 301, Trade Act of 1974
 - ▶ USTR conducts investigation
 - ▶ Upon receipt of report, President makes own decision
 - ▶ Essentially unlimited power, need not be temporary
- ▶ Very rare use of power these days
 - ▶ Pre-WTO (i.e. pre-1994), used very often
 - ▶ But, Dispute Settlement Board is WTO “crown jewel”
- ▶ Is there a real issue here?
 - ▶ Yes: many countries concerned about IPR issues in China

China tariffs

- ▶ March 2018: USTR into China IPR practices finds...
 - ▶ “Forced” tech transfer by JVs, licensing, admin review
 - ▶ “Forced” licensing at below market value (now WTO case)
 - ▶ Tech transfer in US via big investment & acquisitions
 - ▶ Cyber-security intrusions in US to steal business information
- ▶ July 2018: 25% tariff on \$46bn CHN imports
 - ▶ Mostly intermediate goods: machinery, equip
- ▶ September 2018: 10% tariff on \$200bn more CHN imports
 - ▶ About 50% of all CHN imports
 - ▶ Consumer goods
 - ▶ Fish, tires, tech goods, handbags, sport goods, furniture, apparel, beauty & household goods [▶ Quartz](#)
 - ▶ Was set to go to 25% on March 1st. Now delayed.

Winners & losers in US

- ▶ **Winners: producers (& workers) getting protection**
 - ▶ Public hearings on which industries should get protection
 - ▶ Steel, furniture, textiles industries pushed hard
- ▶ **Losers**
 - ▶ Consumers, including firms relying on CHN machinery/equip
 - ▶ Industries facing foreign retaliation

Industry	US EX to CHN	Share of US EX
Soybeans	\$12.4bn	57%
Vehicles	\$11.3bn	10%
Crude Oil	\$4.4bn	20%
Shellfish	\$1.2bn	23%
Wood	\$1.2bn	52%
Raw Hides	\$0.8bn	78%
Sorghum	\$0.8bn	78%

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- ▶ Is there a real issue here?
 - ▶ No

Auto tariffs

- ▶ Mid Feb 2019: Dept of Commerce delivers report
 - ▶ President has 90 days to act (any day now!)
 - ▶ 25% tariffs rumored
- ▶ Imports: \$200bn autos, \$150bn auto parts
 - ▶ Auto imports excl trucks: 87% from EU, JAP, CAN, MEX
 - ▶ Current tariffs: 0% CAN & MEX, 2.5% EU & JAP
 - ▶ Truck imports: 92% from CAN & MEX
 - ▶ Current tariffs: 0% CAN & MEX

Winners & losers in US

▶ Winners

- ▶ Car producers... no, vehemently opposed (Ford?)
 - ▶ Import lots of cars
 - ▶ Import lots of car parts
 - ▶ Fear foreign retaliation
- ▶ Car part producers... no, strongly opposed too
 - ▶ Scared of impacts on car producers

▶ Losers

- ▶ Car producers, car parts producers, workers
 - ▶ Major plants in AL, SC, TN
 - ▶ PIIIE: 195k jobs gone in 1-3 years (upto 625k with retaliation)
- ▶ Consumers
 - ▶ PIIIE: price increases of 8-25%
 - ▶ Depends on amount of foreign content, pass through

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Motivation

- ▶ Lots of political rhetoric about the trade deficit

$$\text{Trade deficit} = \text{Imports} - \text{Exports}$$

- ▶ 2017 Trade deficit = \$568bn
 - ▶ Goods Trade deficit = \$811bn
 - ▶ Services Trade surplus = \$243bn
- ▶ Trump (NYT 3/5/18, Twitter 3/7/18)

“Not half a million dollars. Not 12 cents. We lost \$800 billion a year on trade.”

“Last year we had a Trade Deficit of almost 800 Billion Dollars. Bad policies & leadership. Must WIN again!”

Interpretation #1: US has to pay for imports somehow...

- ▶ Trade deficit
 - ▶ \$ of goods & services IM by US $>$ \$ of G&S EX by US
 - ▶ IM \$100 computers from China, EX \$40 soybeans to China
- ▶ But, China demands payment of some kind!
 - ▶ \$40 soybeans insufficient payment for \$100 computers!
 - ▶ US pays \$60 with financial assets
 - ▶ Govt bonds, corporate bonds, stocks, factories
- ▶ Trade deficit \Leftrightarrow foreigners financing US govt/firm borrowing
 - ▶ Trade surplus \Leftrightarrow US financing foreign govt/firm borrowing

Interpretation #2: China can buy US goods or assets...

- ▶ US buys \$100 computers from China, paid in CNY
 - ▶ US sells \$100 on FX market, gets 700 CNY
 - ▶ US gets computers from China, pays 700 CNY
 - ▶ At this point, US trade deficit is \$100
 - ▶ Has US “lost” \$100?
- ▶ What does China do with \$100?
 - ▶ Buy US goods or US assets?
 - ▶ \uparrow US assets bought \Rightarrow trade deficit \uparrow towards \$100
 - ▶ \uparrow US goods bought \Rightarrow trade deficit \downarrow towards \$0
 - ▶ This choice depends on
 - ▶ state of US macroeconomy (e.g. investment climate)
 - ▶ state of Chinese economy, Chinese demographics

Interpretation #3: GDP identity


$$\underbrace{Y}_{\text{National income}} = \underbrace{C + I + G}_{\text{National expenditure}} + \underbrace{X - M}_{\text{National savings}}$$
$$\underbrace{M - X}_{\text{Trade deficit}} = I - \underbrace{(Y - C - T)}_{\text{Private savings}} - \underbrace{(T - G)}_{\text{Govt savings}}$$

► Key observation

$$\begin{aligned}\text{Trade deficit} &= \text{Investment} - \text{National savings} \\ &= \text{Investment} + \text{Govt deficit} - \text{Private savings}\end{aligned}$$

- Trade deficit and national borrowing flip sides of same coin!!
 - Without trade: Investment = National savings
 - With trade deficit: Investment > National savings
 - With trade surplus: Investment < National savings


Data: want to eliminate the trade deficit?



Source: Table 1.1.10 US National Income Accounts, Bureau of Economic Analysis.

Figure: US current account (% of GDP)

Data: want to eliminate the trade deficit?



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
Figure: US current account (% of GDP)

Surely lower trade deficit increases growth/jobs!

$$Y = C + I + G - (M - X)$$

- ▶ Suppose US consumers decide to save more and...
 - ▶ “Make America great again!” \Rightarrow only buy less foreign goods
 - ▶ But, $\downarrow (M - X) = \downarrow C$ and $\therefore Y$ unchanged
- ▶ Suppose \downarrow relative price of US steel
 - ▶ Perhaps, US buys more steel & subst from foreign to dom steel
 - ▶ So $\downarrow (M - X)$ and possible that $\uparrow Y$ (full employment?)
- ▶ Suppose falling aggregate demand pushes US into recession
 - ▶ Hence $\downarrow Y$. In turn, $\downarrow C$ and $\downarrow M$. But, X unchanged.
 - ▶ So $\downarrow Y$ and $\downarrow (M - X)$
- ▶ **Takeaway:** unclear correlation b/w growth/jobs & trade deficit

Data: growth and the trade deficit



Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis

Figure: US current account (% of GDP)

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Conclusions

- ▶ Very extensive & very rare use of executive trade authority
- ▶ Growing tensions between US and China
- ▶ Some real issues here
 - ▶ Chinese steel overcapacity
 - ▶ Chinese tech/IP practices
 - ▶ Trade deficit, especially bilateral, NOT a real issue
 - ▶ Trade balance is NOT a trade scorecard!!
 - ▶ Trade deficit improves when investment plummets
 - ▶ Empirically, US growth higher when trade deficit higher
- ▶ US taking unprecedented unilateral actions
 - ▶ Not exploiting similar concerns of other countries
 - ▶ Could violate WTO rules

